About Updating by Smets, Philippe
378 
About Updating. 
Philippe Smets 
IRIDIA, Universite Libre de Bruxelles 
50 av. F. Roosevelt, CP194/6. B-1050 Brussels, Belgium. 
Abstract: 
Survey of several forms of updating, with a 
practical illustrative example. 
We study several updating (conditioning) schemes that 
emerge naturally from a common scenario to provide 
some insights into their meaning. Updating is a subtle 
operation and there is no single method, no single 'good' 
rule. The choice of the appropriate rule must always be 
given due consideration. Planchet (1989) presents a 
mathematical survey of many rules.We focus on the 
practical meaning of these rules. After summarizing the 
several rules for conditioning, we present an illustrative 
example in which the various forms of conditioning can 
be explained. 
1. CONDITIONING RULES FOR 
BELIEF FUNCTIONS. 
Let 11 be a finite set with elements rot. ro2, ... ron. The 
roi are mutually exclusive possible answers to a given 
question. Let bel: 211�[0,1] be a belief function over 11, 
with m its corresponding basic belief mass assignment. 
For A <;;;11, bel(A) quantifies our degree of belief that the 
true answer to the question is in A. If the roi are an 
exhaustive list of possible answers, the closed-world 
assumption prevails (as no solution exists 
outside Q), otherwise the open-world assumption prevails 
(Smets 1988) 
Suppose �new piec� of evidence that says that the answer 
is not in A, where A is the set of roi that are elements of 
11, but not of A. To say that the answer is not in A does 
not mean that the answer is in A. Under closed-world 
assumption both statements are equivalent. Under open­
world assumption, they are not. Here, the answer might 
be non� of the elements of 11. When I say ':!_he answer is 
not in A", I only eliminate the elements of A as possible 
answer. When I say "the �nswer is in A", not only I 
eliminate the elements of A, but I also claim that the 
answer is an element of A - a much stronger claim. This 
distinction is at the origin of the difference between the 
open-world and the closed-world assumptions. 
The updating of �I induced by the information that the 
answer is not in A can be performed variously. It will 
depend on the interpretation of the problem that bel is 
supposed to model. 
Conditioning C.l. The Unnormalized 
Dempster's Rule of Conditioning. 
For all X<;;;11, the basic belief masses m(X) given to X 
is transferred to An X. The basic belief masses 
assignment IDA , the belief function belA and the 
plausibility function piA obtained after conditioning on A 
are: 
IDA(B) = L m(BuX) for B<;;;A 
X<;;;A 
IDA(B) = 0 for B<J;A 
belA (B) = bel(BuA)- bel( A) for B<;;;11 
plA(B) = pl(BnA) for B<;;;Q 
This solution is always applicable, even when pl(A) = 0. 
Notice that m A (0) might be non null with this solution. 
In fact, one has: mA(0) = m(0) + bel(A). 
This rule is the one described in the transferable belief 
model under open world assumption (Smets 1988). 
Conditioning C.2. The Normalized Dempster's 
Rule of Conditioning. 
Masses are transferred as in conditioning C. 1, but the 
result is then proportionally normalized to cope with the 
masses that would be transferred to the empty set. This 
avoids ending with a positive mass on 0, and guarantees 
that bel(Q) = 1. After conditioning, one gets: 
IDA(B) =c L m(Bu X )  for B<;;;A,Bt0 
x<;;;A 
IDA(B) = 0 
and for B<;;;11 
belA (B) = c (bel(BuA)- bel(A) ) 
plA(B) = c pl(BnA) 
where c·1 
= bel(11) - bel(A) = pi( A). 
for B<J;A 
This solution applies only when pl(A)>O. No solution is 
provided when pl(A)=O. 
This rule is the one described in the transferable belief 
model under closed world assumption. It is the one 
initially proposed by Shafer (1976a). 
Conditioning C.2'. Bayesian solution. 
The classical solution with probability function is, 
_ P(BnA) c PA(B)- P(A) for B 
_Q. 
This solution applies only if P(A)>O. If P(A)=O, no 
solution is provided. 
This is a particular case of conditioning C.2. It is 
obtained when the belief function bel is a probability 
function. 
Conditioning C.3. Yager-Kohlas's Solution. 
The basic belief masses are transferred as in C.1, but the 
masses that could be transferred to the empty set are 
reallocated to A, so: 
mA(B) = I. m(BuX) VB<:A,Bo<A,B,.t0 
x<:A 
mA(A) = L m(AuX) + bel(A) 
X<:A 
mA(B) = 0 VB�A 
be!A(B) = bel(BuA) - bel(A) VB<:A,Bo<A 
belA(A) = bel(Q) 
plA(B) = pl(BnA) + bel(A) VB<:A 
This conditioning might seem artificial, but it will be 
shown that it can be observed sometimes. It was proposed 
in Yager (1985) and Kohlas (1989). It applies normally 
only to normalized belief functions (i.e., those with 
m(0)=0 or equivalently with bel(Q)=l) 
Conditioning C.4. Geometric Rule of 
Conditioning. 
One way to condition belief functions consists in deciding 
that all basic belief masses not given to subsets of A are 
nullified, and those given to subsets of A are 
proportionally normalized so their sum remains one. Then 
mA, belA and piA become: 
_!!!@__ =bel( A) 
=0 
bel (B) = bei(BnA) A bel(� 
p!A(B) = 
pl(BuA) - p l(A) 
pl(Q) - pl(A) 
if B<:A 
otherwise 
VB<:Q 
VB<:Q 
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These relations are described under the closed-world 
assumption. Their extensions under open-world 
assumption are obtained by suppressing the denominators 
in mA , belA and piA . The geometrical rule of 
conditioning has been discussed in Suppes and Zanotti 
(1977) and Shafer (1976b). 
Conditioning C.S. Specialization. 
Kruse (1990) has studied a conditioning rule that applies 
to the transferable belief model and is probably the most 
general form of conditioning that ties in with the idea of 
basic belief masses that quantify the part of belief that 
supports a set A of Q and cannot support a more specific 
subset of A through lack of information. The idea is that 
the basic belief mass given to a set A is distributed 
among the subsets B of A. This concept was also studied 
by Yager (1986) and Dubois and Prade (1986) when they 
introduced the ideas of belief inclusions. These authors 
work under closed-world assumption. Our presentation is 
made under the open-world assumption. 
For each subset X<:Q, let c(B, X) VX,B<:Q be non 
negative coefficients such that: 
c(B,X) = O  if B�X 
L c(B,X) = 1 
B<:X 
Then the basic belief masses m* obtained by a 
specialization based on the c(B, X) coefficients are: 
m*(B) = I, c(B, X) m(X) VB<:Q 
B<:X 
The Dempster and the geometric rule of conditioning are 
specializations. Suppose we known that the answer to the 
question about Q is not in A<:Q. 
One obtains the unnormalized Dempster's rule of 
conditioning when c(B, BuY) = 1, Y<:A. Then: 
mA(B) = I. c(B, BuY) m(BuY) vBc;;;;A 
y<;;;Q 
One obtains the unnormalized geometric rule of 
conditioning if c@, B) = 1 whenever B<: A and c(0, B) = 
1 whenever BnAo<0 otherwise. Normalized rules of 
conditioning are obtained by further rescaling. 
Yager-Kohlas conditioning_js not a specialization as the 
masses given to subsets of A are transferred to A. 
Remark: the unnormalized Dempster's rule of 
combination is also a specialization. Suppose there exist 
two basic belief masses assignment m 1 and mz on Q. Let 
m 12 = m 1 almz and let c(X, Z) = m 1 (XIZ). Then (Smets 
1991b): 
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m12(X) = I. m1(XuY) m2(XuZ) = 
YnZ=0 Y,Z�A 
= I. m 1 (XIZ) m2(Z) 
Z�O 
Conditioning C.6. Imaging. 
Lewis (1976) considers that probabilities are given to 
worlds, so each roi represents a world. If one learns that a 
set A of world is impossible (does not contain th� 
answer), then the probabilities given to the worlds in A 
are transferred to the 'closest' worlds in A. 
Suppose the 'closest' relation n(ro, A): OxO�O with 
n(ro, A) being the world in A that is the closest to world 
ro. So n(ro, A)e A and n(ro, A)=ro if roe A, i.e., the 
worlds in A are the closest to themselves. 
After conditioning on A by the imaging method, the 
probability P(ro) given to a world ro is transferred to the 
world n(ro, A). 
Let F(roilroj) = 1 if roi= n(roj> A) 
= 0 otherwise 
Then P A(roi) = L F(roilroj) P(roj) \I roie 0.  
ro·e 0 J -
Note that P A (roi) = 0 if roie A. We use the conditional 
probability notation for F to enhance the fact that F 
behaves as a conditional probability function. 
Of course the idea of 'closest' world needs to be defined 
and most of the criticism against this conditioning rule 
focusses on criticism of the idea of closeness between 
worlds (see Gardenfors 1988). 
Gardenfors (1988) generalizes Lewis's imaging. He 
considers that the probability given to a world that is 
learned to be impossible is distributed among the 
remaining worlds according to some probability 
distribution that somehow reflect closeness between 
worlds. F(roilroj) will repres�t the portion of the 
probability given to world roje A that is transferred to 
world roie A. So let: 
and 
F(roilroj) = 0 
=I 
=0 
�0 
L F(roilroj) = 1 
(l)iE 0 
if (l)iE A 
if (l)jE A, (l)i = (l)j 
if (l)jE!, (l)i "# (l)j 
if roje A and roie A 
Vroje 0 
Conditioning on A leads to the relations: 
Note that P A(roi) = 0 if roie A. 
These relations were described for probability function 
(under closed-world assumption). They can be general�ed 
in two ways: 1) the requirement F(roilroj) = 0 if roie A is 
dropped, and 2) the domain from 0 to 20 is generalized 
(one assimilates the basic belief masses to probabilities 
on the power set 20). Let the relation F:20x20�[0, 1] 
with: I. F(BIX) = 1 VX�O 
B�O 
After conditioning on 'not in A', one gets: 
mA(B) = I. F(BIX) m(X) VB�O 
X�O 
This conditioning relation subsumes all those presented 
so far. 
Specialization is obtained if: 
F(BIX) = 0 VBnA-#0 
Yager-Kohlas conditioning is �btained if: 
F(BIX) = 0 VBnA;t0 
= 1 B�A.X=BuYVY�A 
= 1 B=A,X�A 
Conditioning C.7. Upper and Lower Bayesian 
Conditioning. 
Suppose I know only that an unknown probability 
function P over 0 belongs to a convex subset <J> of the 
set IP of the probability functions defined on 0. The 
upper and lower probabilities P* and P* define P 
uniquely, where 
\I A�O P*(A) =max (P(A) : Pe !1') 
P*(A) = min (P(A) : Pe <J>). 
P(AnB) Suppose one asks for the value of P(BIA) = P(A) . All 
that can be said is that P(BIA) is between the upper and 
lower conditional probabilities P*(BIA) and P*(BIA), 
where \I A �0 (Smets 1987): 
P*(BIA) =max (P(BIA) : Pe <J>) 
P*(BIA) = min (P(BIA) : Pe <J>). 
It can be shown that (see Dempster 1967, Fagin and 
Halpern 1990, Jaffray 1990, Zhang 1989): 
P*(BIA) P
*(AnB) 
P*(AnB)+P*(AnB) 
P*(AnB) P*(BIA) = ----'-----' �� P*(AnB)+P*(AnB) 
Fagin and Halpern (1990), Jaffray (1990) and Zhang 
(1989) show that if P*(.) is a belief function, then P*(.IA) 
is also a belief function. Jaffray (1990) also provides the 
basic belief masses derived from P*(.IA) by the inverse 
Moebius transform. 
It can be shown that the Upper and Lower Bayesian 
Conditioning is not a specialization. It is a generalized 
imaging where the coefficents depend on the basic belief 
masses of the initial belief function. 
2. THE SCENARIO: THE VOTING 
INTENTIONS STUDY. 
To illustrate the meaning of the various rules of 
conditioning we have described, we present a scenario that 
deals with objective data, induced objective proportions, 
and where the various forms of conditioning can be 
described, depending on the contextual information. 
Suppose I organize a study on how people will vote in 
the next election. Let Q = (a, b, c, d, e) be the set of 
candidates. One candidate must be selected by I 00 voters. 
Each voter may vote for only one candidate. Voting will 
be next Sunday and today, Monday, I shall ask each 
potential voter to indicate for whom he intends to vote. 
But voters' opinions, today, are not firmly established and 
some voters can only point to a subset A of Q that 
contains the name of the candidate they will vote for, but 
they have not yet decided definitively among these 
candidates in set A. We accept that voters will always 
vote for one of the candidates belonging to the set they 
provided to on Monday; opinions can only be made more 
specific. 
Sets Answered Frequencies Sets after 
Conditioning 
{a} 5 ? 
(a, b) 8 ? 
(a,b,c} 15 {c) 
{b, c, d} 21 {c. d) 
{a, b, c, d) 29 {c, d) 
(d,e} 22 (d,e} 
Table 1. Distribution of voters' intentions Monday, and 
sets of candidates that remain after the conditioning on { c, 
d, e}. ? indicates ambiguities that are discussed in the 
various conditioning schemes. 
The voting intentions of the 100 voters are summarized in 
table 1. Note that the data do not result from a survey 
based on a sample, but from an exhaustive study of the 
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whole population. This prevents problems related to 
sampling variations. 
On Sunday, the 100 voters will vote and their votes will 
generate a frequency distribution over Q. Let IP be the set 
of frequency distributions Prop over Q, where Prop( a) for 
aE Q is the proportion of voters who vote a, and Prop( A) 
= L Prop(a) for Ac;;;n1. We will neglect the fact that 
aE A 
the population is finite, and accept that Prop( A) for A c;;;n 
can take any value in [0, 1). 
On Sunday, one element of IP will be selected, the one 
corresponding to the distribution of votes. But today we 
do not for instance know Prop(a). We know that Prop(a) 
is at least 5%, at most 78%. Any value in between is 
acceptable. So all the Monday data says is that Prop 
belongs to a subset fP of IP where fP contains all those 
frequency distributions on n compatible with the 
observed frequencies given in table 1. The set fP is 
uniquely defined by the upper and lower proportions 
Prop* and Prop* where 'if A c;;; n 
Prop*(A) = max{ Prop(A): PropE ff>} 
and Prop*(A) =min { Prop( A): PropE ff>} 
Some upper and lower proportions induced by the data of 
table 1 are given in table 2. The proportions Prop( A) will 
be such that 'if A c;;; n: 
Prop*( A) :>Prop( A) :> Prop*(A) 
Set 
{a} 
{a, b) 
{a, b, c} 
{c) 
{d) 
{c, d} 
{c,d, e) 
5=5% 
5+8 = 13% 
5+8+15 = 28% 
0=0% 
0=0% 
0 = 0% 
22 = 22% 
Prop* 
5+8+15+29- 57% 
5+8+15+21+29 = 78% 
5+8+15+21+29 = 78% 
15+21+29 = 65% 
21+29+22 = 72% 
15+21+29+22 = 87% 
15+21+29+22 = 87% 
Table 2. Values for some upper and lower proportions 
induced by the data of table 1. 
We are facing a typical case of upper and lower 
proportions generated by random sets. 
3. CONDITIONING. 
I collected my data on Monday, but on Tuesday I learn 
candidates a and b were killed in a car accident during the 
night. What can I say about Sunday's elections results? 
I We speak of proportions, not of probablity, in order to 
avoid any confusion. Probability admits many definitions. 
Using proportions, and later beliefs, will prevent -
hopefully - any confusion. 
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The 15 voters who answered (a, b, c) will have to vote 
for c as c is the only remaining candidate and these 15 
voters had indicated their willingness to consider a 
candidate in {a, b, c).  Identically, the 21 and 29 voters 
who had answered {b, c, d) or {a, b, c, d) will vote for a 
candidate in ( c, d) . 
The impact of the conditioning information, a and b are 
dead, results in a transfer of frequencies similar to the one 
described in the transferable belief model. The frequency 
given to a set X is transferred _!o the set Xn Y once we 
know that the truth is not in Y. But what about the 13 
voters who answered (a) or (a, b)? 
Several scenarios can be considered that lead to the 
different solutions we wish to illustrate. Some may 
appear somewhat artificial, but that is not the point. We 
only wish to give a meaning to each conditioning rule. 
The labels of the scenarios are those of the conditioning 
rules described in section 2. 
Scenario Cl : Compulsory Voting. 
Suppose we are in Belgium where voting is compulsory 
(absentees are fined). The 13 voters must cast their votes. 
If blank voting is allowed, we might consider they will 
cast blank votes. Table C.1 presents some upper and 
lower proportions induced after conditioning on ( c, d, e) . 
Note that 13 blank votes will be collected, so Prop*(0)= 
Prop*(0) = 13%. 
Set 
(c) 
{d) 
(c,d) 
(c, d,e) 
15 = 15% 
0 = 0% 
15+21+29 = 65% 
65+22 = 87% 
Prop* 
15+21+29 = 65% 
21+29+22 = 72% 
15+21+29+22 = 87% 
15+21+29+22 = 87% 
Table C.l. Values for some upper and lower 
proportions induced by the frequencies of table 1 and the 
conditioning C. l .  (65 = 15+21+29) 
This conditioning rule is similar to Dempster's rule of 
conditioning under open world assumption. 
Scenario C.2. Free Voting. 
Same as Scenario C. l ,  but we compute proportions 
among those who do not abstain. This is also the French 
situation where there is no obligation to vote, in which 
case the 13 voters would not vote on Sunday. Table C.2 
presents some upper and lower proportions induced after 
conditioning on ( c, d, e) 
This conditioning rule is similar to Dempster's rule of 
conditioning under closed-world assumption. It is identical 
with the C.l conditioning rule except for the 
normalization factor (the division by 87). 
Set 
(c) 
{d) 
{c,d) 
{c, d, e) 
Prop* 
15 
87 = 17.2% 
0 
87 = 0.0% 
65 
87 = 74.7% 
65+ 22 - 100% 87 -
Prop* 
15+21+29 74.7% 87 
2 1+29+22 82.8% 87 
65
8;
22 = 100% 
65+22 = 100% 87 
Table C.2. Values for some upper and lower 
proportions induced by the frequencies of table 1 and the 
conditioning C.2. 
Scenario C.3. Compulsory Choice. 
Back to Belgium context C. 1 (compulsory voting), but 
blank votes are not allowed. So all I know about the 13 
voters that pose a problem is that they will vote for a 
candidate in ( c, d, e) .  Table C.3 presents some upper and 
lower proportions induced after conditioning on ( c, d, e) . 
Set 
(c) 
(d) 
{c, d) 
(c, d, e) 
15=15% 
0=0% 
15+21+29=65% 
65+22+ 13=100% 
Prop* 
15+21+29+13=78% 
21+29+22+13=85% 
65+22+13=100% 
65+22+13=100% 
Table C.3. Values for some upper and lower 
proportions induced by the frequencies of table 1 and the 
conditioning C.3. 
This conditioning is similar to Yager-Kohlas rule. 
Scenario C.4: Geometrical Rule. 
Suppose that each voter who had given an answer that 
contained a or b is so depressed that he commits suicide. 
Then only 22 voters are left. The proportions among 
those who had answered a subset of ( c, d, e) will be 
proportionally rescaled. Table C.4 presents some upper 
and lower proportions induced after conditioning on { c, d, 
e). 
Set 
(c, d) 
{d, e) 
Prop* 
0 = 0% 
22 
22 = 100% 
Prop* 
22 
22 = 100% 
22 -= 100% 22 
Table C.4. Values for some upper and lower 
proportions induced by the frequencies of table 1 and the 
conditioning C.4. 
This conditioning corresponds to the geometrical rule of 
conditioning, a form also encountered naturally in 
scenarios based on random sets (Smets 1990a) 
Scenario C.S: Specialization 
Specialization is obtained when I consider that the 
information "a and b are dead' allows me to reconsider 
each voter's answer. For each type of answer, I consider 
that those who select it will be distributed among its 
subsets not containing a and b according to a known 
distribution. The coefficients c of the specialization are 
these probabilities. As an example, suppose I know (by 
my knowledge of the political links among the candidates) 
that: 1) among those who answered (b, c, d), one third 
will vote c, one third will vote d, one third is still 
undecided, 2) among those who answered (a, b, c, d), half 
will vote d, the other half is still undecided, and 3) among 
those who answer ( d, e), half will vote d, the others will 
vote e. The 13 voters who answer (a) and (a, b) will cast 
blank votesas in scenario C.1 (normalization can be 
introduced as in scenario C2). Table C.5 presents some 
upper and lower proportions induced after conditioning on 
(c, d, e). 
Set 
(c) 
(d) 
(c,d) 
(c,d,e) 
15+7=22% 
7+ 14.5+ 11=32.5% 
65+11=76% 
65+22=87% 
Prop* 
15+ 14+ 14.5=43.5% 
14+29+ 11=54% 
65+11=76% 
65+22=87% 
Table C.S. Values for some upper and lower 
proportions induced by the frequencies of table 1 and the 
conditioning C.5. 
This conditioning form corresponds to the specialization. 
Scenario C.6.1. Introspective Realloca-tion: 
level 1. 
Maybe I know more about the candidates than their 
names. I know that a and b had similar political 
orientations and that among c, d and e, c is politically the 
closest to a and b. Then I might consider that the 13 
voters without a candidate will vote for c. Table C.6.1 
presents some upper and lower proportions induced after 
conditioning on ( c, d, e) 
Set 
(c) 
{d) 
(c,d) 
(c, d, e) 
15+13=28% 
0=()% 
65+13=78% 
65+22+ 13=100% 
Prop* 
15+21+29+13-78% 
21+29+22=72% 
65+22+13=100% 
65+ 22+ 13= 100% 
Table C.6.1. Values for some upper and lower 
proportions induced by the frequencies of table 1 and the 
conditioning C.6.1. 
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This conditioning generalizes the imaging conditioning 
introduced by Lewis where: 
VY�A F(BIBuY) = l B�A 
= 0 otherwise 
Scenario C.6.2. Introspective Realloca-ion: 
level 2. 
Generalizing Scenario C.6. 1, we might consider c as 
politically very close to a and b, d as quite similar to a 
and b, and e totally different. So we might accept that 
there is a certain proportion of the 13 voters that will vote 
for c and the remainder will vote for c or d. Let the 
proportion of people that will vote for c given they had 
decided to vote for a or b be 0.4, and the others will vote 
for (c,d). 
Table C.6.2 presents some upper and lower proportions 
induced after conditioning on ( c, d, e). 
Set 
(c) 
{d) 
(c, d) 
[c, d, e) 
15+5.2=20.2% 
0=0% 
65+13=78% 
65+22+ 13=100% 
Prop* 
15+21+29+13-78% 
2 1+29+22+7.8=80% 
65+22+13=100% 
65+22+13=100% 
Table C.6.2. Values for some upper and lower 
proportions induced by the frequencies of table 1 and the 
conditioning C.6.2. 
This form of conditioning generalizes Giirdenfors's 
Imaging to power sets, where 
VY�A F(BIY) �0 B�A 
= 0 otherwise 
Scenario C.6.3. Introspective Realloca-tion: 
level 3. 
You might be even more subtle in your opinion than in 
scenario C.6.2. You might consider differently the 5 
voters who answered (a) and the 8 who answered (a, b). 
Set 
(c) 
{d) 
(c,d) 
(c,d,e) 
15+6=21% 
0=0% 
65+11=76% 
65+22+ 13=100% 
Prop* 
65+13-78% 
21+29+22+5=77% 
65+22+13=100% 
65+22+13=100% 
Table C.6.3. Values for some upper and lower 
proportions induced by the frequencies of table 1 and the 
conditioning C.6.3. 
They are not identical and you might consider that the 
distribution of the 5 among ( c, d, e) is different from the 
distribution of the 8. For instance, you might consider 
that 1) among the 5 voters who answered (a) Monday, 
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40% (=2) would answer {c) Tuesday, the other (=3) (c, d), 
and 2) among the 8 voters who answered {a, b}, half (=4) 
would answer {c) ,  one quarter (=2) would answer {c, d) 
and the last quarter (=2) would answer {c, e).  Table C.6.3 
presents some upper and lower proportions induced after 
conditioning on { c, d, e) . 
This corresponds to the generalization of the imaging 
where 
F(BIB) = 1 
F(BIX) :?: 0 
=0 
if B�A 
if B�A, X�A 
otherwise 
Scenario C.7. Upper and Lower Bayesian 
Conditioning. 
Before learning that a and b are dead, i.e., Monday 
evening, I would like to assess the proportion of those 
who will vote for c among those who will vote for c or d 
or e on Sunday. Should I know the frequency distribution 
of the Sunday votes, I would compute 
Prop({c)) Prop({c}l{c, d, e})=p ({ d ) )  rop c, , e 
But I do not know these values. All I know are upper and 
lower limits for each Prop. I know that Prop is in a 
subset fJ> of IP, the set of frequency distributions on Q. 
For each Prop in fJ>, I can compute Prop({c) l{c, d, e)). 
Set 
{c) 
{d) 
{c, d) 
{d, e) 
Prop* 
0 
0+21+29+22 = O% 
0 
0+65+22 0% 
0 
0+22 =O% 
22 
22+65 = 25·3% 
Prop* 
65 
65+0 = 100% 
21+29+22 100% 21+29+22+0 
65+22 
65+22+0 = 100% 
21+29+22 100% 21+29+22+0 
Table C.7. Values for some upper and lower 
conditional proportions induced by the frequencies of table 
1 and the conditioning C.7. 
Consequently I know that the upper lower limits of 
Prop( {c) I { c, d, e}) are between the upper and lower 
conditional proportions Prop*(.! { c, d, e}) and Prop*(.! { c, 
d, e)) where 
* Prop({c)) m Prop (AI{c,d,e}) = max{p ({ d ) )  : Prope or ) rop c, , e 
Prop*({ c)) = Prop*({c) )+Prop*({d, e}) 
. Prop({c)) m Prop*(AI{c,d,e}) = mm{Prop({c, d, e) ): Prope or l 
Prop*({c}) = Prop*( {c) )+Prop*( { d, e) )  
This conditioning corresponds to the upper and lower 
bayesian conditioning. 
4. BELIEFS INDUCED BY THE 
PROPORTIONS. 
Suppose a voter is going to be selected randomly among 
the 100 voters (with equiprobability for each voter). The 
question is to bet on who is the Sunday candidate of this 
randomly selected voter. 
Given the available data, all I can say is that the 
proportion Prop( A) of voters who will vote for a candidate 
in set A�Q on Sunday is included between Prop*(A) and 
Prop*( A). So the probability P(A) that the selected voters 
will vote for a candidate in A is included between 
Prop*( A) and Prop*(A). Thus I can build upper and lower 
probabilities P*(A) and P*(A) for P(A) where P*(A) = 
Prop*(A) and P*(A) = Prop*(A). Given this set of upper 
and lower probabilities, I can build the pignistic 
probabilities BetP of the fact that the randomly selected 
voter will vote for a candidate in A (Smets 1990b), (see 
also Smets (199Ib) for a practical justification of the 
pignistic transformation). 
BetP(A) = L m(X) IX�t l 
X�Q 
where lXI is the number of candidates in set X�Q. BetP 
is a probability function, and all bets on Q are built on it. 
But the know ledge of these upper and lower probabilities 
can also induce a belief in me about the candidate for 
which the randomly selected voter will vote. As shown in 
Smets (1991a), the belief function that quantifies my 
belief about Q is numerically equal to the lower 
probabilities function (because mathematically the lower 
probability happens to be a belief function in the present 
scenario). This is based on the maximal-minimal 
isopignistic transformation described in Smets (1991a). 
The pignistic transformation of this belief function is of 
course the same as the one derived from the upper and 
lower probabilities. So analysing the problem directly 
from the upper and lower probabilities point of view or 
through the belief function induced by these upper and 
lower probabilities leads to the same results. 
A bet on who will be the Sunday winner is not analysed. 
It requires a study of our belief concerning the subsets of 
IP. The belief that x is the winner is equal to the belief 
allocated to those frequency distributions in ff> � IP where 
x is the most frequent observation. That is a completely 
different problem altogether and will not be dealt with. 
5. CONCLUSIONS. 
We have shown that conditioning can be performed by 
many rules, and through an illustrative example, we have 
provided scenarios that lead to each form of conditioning. 
This study is not exhaustive as other forms of updating 
can - and have been - suggested (Cano and Moral 1990, 
Moral and De Campos 1990). We hope that these 
illustrative examples will help the user understand the 
meaning of the various conditioning rules we have 
studied. 
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